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Abstract 
Amidst growing analytical interest in the spatial dimensions of sustainable energy 
transitions, relatively little attention has been given to the role of sub-national 
government, or the ways in which dominant socio-technical regimes navigate diverse 
contexts. This paper addresses these concerns in a linked fashion by assessing the 
impacts of devolution within the UK on renewable energy development. It draws 
principally on policy networks analysis as the basis of a comparative assessment, 
examining how far the governments of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales have 
translated their formal powers in the energy sphere into renewable energy outcomes. 
Scotland’s relative success in facilitating rapid expansion of on-shore wind is attributed 
to a more enduring and cohesive policy community around of renewable energy growth 
than in Northern Ireland and Wales, but this success has been adversely affected by 
fragmenting policy networks around renewables at national (UK) level. The analysis 
highlights especially the role of planning and consenting, as mechanisms by which 
devolved governments have worked to contain the potentially disruptive effects of 
opposition to major infrastructure investments, thereby enhancing regime 
reproduction. 
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1 Introduction 
Forging more sustainable patterns of development is an intrinsically spatial task, in that 
broader patterns of change are shaped by actions at multiple sites and scales (Cowell 
and Owens 1998). This is evidently true for the promotion of more sustainable forms of 
energy. Thus for example, the ability of the European Union to deliver targets for 
renewable energy to supply 20% of energy by 2020 (2009/28/EC) and 27% by 2030 is 
shaped by the actions of member states and governments at other levels. 
Since 2012, researchers have begun to engage more closely with the spatial dimensions 
of sustainability transitions (Hansen and Coenen 2015), including in the particular 
context of energy (Bridge et al 2013). The ‘methodological nationalism’ of much 
transitions literature, in which the nation state was adopted, uncritically as the main 
analytical unit, has been challenged (Coenen et al 2012; Truffer and Coenen; 2012; 
Späth and Rohracher, 2013). Researchers have explored the interface between energy, 
transitions, space and scale with contributions from within transitions theory and 
economic geography (Hansen and Coenen 2015; Murphy 2015). Nevertheless, there 
remain some deficits in our understanding. Firstly, while there is burgeoning research 
focused on some arenas of action such as the interface between energy and cities, 
others have pointed to the particular dearth of critical attention to sustainability 
transitions at regional and sub-national government levels (Bruyninckx et al 2012; 
MacEwen and Royles 2015), with few analysts tracing causal relations between energy 
outcomes and the complex panoply of actions undertaken by these governmental tiers 
(though see Smith 2007; Essletzbichler 2012; Hodson and Marvin 2013). Secondly, there 
is a need to consider whether actions in different places and arenas become constitutive 
of wider shifts in production or consumption (Hansen and Coenen 2015; see also 
Essletzbichler 2012); an agenda which requires more critical thinking about the spatial 
constitution of dominant regimes of energy provision – typically referred to as ‘socio-
technical regimes’ – and the way in which these are organised across space, and 
become contextually embedded. These issues are connected, in that identifying how 
sub-national governments have engaged with energy – to refine, amplify, resist, or forge 
alternatives to wider, national norms – may illuminate how pathways towards more 
sustainable forms of energy provision might emerge, as well as how less sustainable 
forms persist (Truffer and Coenen 2012). 
In response to these concerns, this paper assesses the effects of devolution within the 
UK on the delivery of renewable electricity: wind, solar, biomass, hydro, wave and tidal 
power. It focuses primarily on the period from 1998, and compares renewable energy 
outcomes in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, as well as England. The UK case is 
apposite for exploring the spatial dynamics of sustainability and energy transitions, in 
that 1998 saw the instigation of a major wave of political devolution that recast the 
spatial reach of ‘national’ energy policies promulgated by Westminster. 
Patterns of renewable energy development unfolding across the UK have been spatially 
uneven, suggesting that explanations of such outcomes has the potential to offer wider 
insights into how governance can influence the differential prospects of energy 
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transition (Kuzemko et al 2016). Figure 1 shows that for much of the first decade of the 
21st century, Scotland could be considered a ‘leader’ in renewable energy in the UK, 
built mainly on rapid expansion of onshore wind power, from 308MW installed in 2003 
to 5216MW by 20131. Renewable energy capacity in England only surpassed Scotland 
from 2011, relying more heavily on offshore wind, biomass co-firing in existing power 
plants and solar PV. Onshore wind has been the main technology deployed in Northern 
Ireland and Wales. When viewed in terms of capacity installed per capita of population, 
the three devolved territories display higher development levels than England (which 
has approximately 85% of the UK population). Scotland also shows the largest 
renewable energy generating capacity per unit of Gross Value Added, with Wales and 
Northern Ireland also above the UK average (DECC 2013). Clearly then, the level of 
renewable energy developed in the territories of the devolved governments makes 
them critical to the overall transition trajectory of the UK. However, given the complex 
arrangements of powers across the different tiers of government, one cannot infer that 
energy development within any particular sub-national government area can be 
attributed neatly and solely to action by that government. For causal explanations, one 
needs to consider the processes by which patterns of energy development are 
constructed and held together. 
[Insert Figure 1 near here] 
To address issues of causality, the analysis presented here draws on qualitative 
research. The prime data source is 80 semi-structured interviews, conducted with senior 
figures in government (at all scales, politicians and officers), energy companies and 
trade associations, but also non-governmental organisations and local planning 
authorities, between 2011 and 2013.2 This is supported by published government 
energy data and policy documents. The temporal focus is highly apposite, as at the end 
of the main period of the interviews we saw the institutional arrangements for 
supporting renewable energy, built up across the UK over the previous decade, starting 
to be dismantled (see below). Concomitantly, much renewable energy capacity coming 
through at the time of writing (May 2016) reflects investment decisions made in earlier 
years. The focus of the research is on renewable electricity generation, and emphasis is 
given to larger-scale facilities rather than micro-renewables, as this has been the 
dominant form of renewable energy investment in the UK through this period. To 
underpin our conception of agency, and provide a theoretical framework for four-way 
comparison, we utilise network-based explanations of policy formulation and 
implementation, especially policy network analysis (Marsh and Rhodes 1992). This helps 
address a thematic concern for our analysis to relate the formal powers notionally held 
by subnational governments (power in potentia)  to their propensity and capacity to use 
them (power in actu, after Latour 1986). Recognition of the constructed nature of 
governance spatialities is provided by supportive insights from relational perspectives 
on space and scale.  
In sum, the aim of this paper is to explain the effects of devolved governments within 
the UK on renewable energy development. An important dimension of this is to 
evaluate why Scotland has been relatively successful, and reflect on the wider 
 5 
 
significance of this. In so doing, it responds to calls by Hansen and Coenen (2015) for 
greater use of comparative analysis to understand better the causal factors driving 
sustainability transitions, including more careful dissection of the role of power (Lawhon 
and Murphy 2011; Truffer and Coenen 2012) and the need to understand how 
‘embedded norms and power affect policy choices, rules, regulations and outcomes’ 
(Kuzemko et al 2016, p 98) and as such throw light on the types of political and 
institutional conditions that make a shift to renewables more likely. The analysis also 
avoids an unthinking elision of ‘transition’ with ‘technological innovation’, to consider 
the role of subnational government in infrastructure implementation, which is an under-
examined dimension of regime persistence or change. The theoretical position adopted 
is discussed in more detail next, followed by an account of the intersections between 
devolution in the UK and energy governance. The way that the devolved governments 
have utilised two key policy instruments – financial support for renewable and land use 
planning - is then outlined and the development impacts assessed. Following this, policy 
networks analysis is used to explain the policy formulation and energy governance 
approaches of the devolved governments. The paper concludes by summarising key 
findings. 
 
2 Understanding energy transitions 
2.1 Spatial dimensions in the multi-level perspective 
We take as our startpoint the ‘multi-level perspective’ (MLP) (Geels 2002) on socio-
technical transitions, though there is little need to elaborate its precepts here. A central 
concept is that of ‘socio-technical regimes’ which – as in the case of energy – 
characterise particular systems of provision and are embedded in economic processes, 
consumption practices, regulatory arrangements and infrastructure. These regimes are 
seen as ’dynamically stable’ (Geels 2011), sustaining and sustained by incumbent actors. 
Change may be triggered by ‘niche’ innovations, where they can coalesce and challenge 
the socio-technical regime. Opportunities for such challenges can arise from exogenous 
shifts in society, economy or politics – termed the ‘landscape’ level – to the extent that 
they destabilise the existing regime, taking a range of potential pathways that may 
result in a transition to a fundamentally different system, system collapse or backlash to 
the changes as a result of the power of incumbent interests (Geels et al 2016). 
Analysts have started considering how the MLP might be ‘spatialised’, especially in 
terms of the multi-scalar nature of transition processes and their contextually 
embedded nature. A number of debates are pertinent to our analysis here. The first is 
the frequently-made warning that the ‘levels’ in the multi-level perspective ought not 
be conflated with specific, territorial scales arranged hierarchically, but by degrees of 
stability (Geels 2011). Thus ‘niches’ - notionally relatively ‘protective spaces’ in which 
there is more scope for novelties to emerge - have been recognised as composed of 
multiple elements, some locally embedded but others, like financing, arising from 
actions in other arenas such as national government (see Raven et al 2012). Less 
frequently examined – but highly pertinent to a consideration of the role of sub-national 
 6 
 
government – is the spatial constitution and reach of the socio-technical regimes. 
Truffer and Coenen (2012) have proposed that such regimes should not be seen as 
(spatially) monolithic, or nationally bounded, but as cutting across and connecting 
different territories and scales that, as they are orchestrated across space, unevenly 
distribute opportunities for actions that may stabilise or destabilise them. These 
insightful observations have been under-exploited to date. 
However, understanding the contextual embeddedness of socio-technical regimes in 
regions and places (Lawhon and Murphy 2011) would benefit from questioning the tacit 
inference in some transitions thinking that somehow regimes are less exposed to the 
diverse exigencies of context than niches. Research from science and technology studies 
and techno-politics (Barry 2001), leads us to confront the fact that the elements that 
constitute regimes (markets, infrastructure, regulatory rules) are always a potentially 
fragile abstraction from the multiplicity of elements, forms and processes beyond the 
system, which they interact with, and with which they are in ‘contingent, uneasy and 
unstable interrelationships’ (Ong and Collier 2005, 12). Careful attention is required to 
how contextual conditions impinge on them if they are to be reproduced. Indeed, 
aspects of regime reproduction and development may also require ‘protective spaces’ 
that insulate them from disruption or political critique. Furthermore, it may be 
problematic to treat socio-technical regimes as if homogeneous configuration across 
space was always a defining quality (Hansen and Coenen 2015). For regimes to be 
durable across space and time, it may be desirable that key elements are open to 
contextual adaptation so that they work in diverse settings (after Laet 2000). Spatial 
flexibility may therefore serve persistence as well as transformation. 
This leads us to a second set of debates, concerning a dominant emphasis within 
transition thinking on innovation, especially technological innovation, as the main driver 
of change (Hansen and Coenen 2015; Geels 2011)..The spatial dynamics of 
implementation – the rolling out of technologies, at scale, both those that are newer 
and those that are more mature - has been less well considered despite being equally 
critical to transition dynamics (Cowell 2016). Understanding adoption and 
implementation requires transitions analysts to give greater attention to the navigation 
of infrastructure siting and delivery processes, which brings into view the wider social 
and political conditions in which technologies and infrastructures are deployed: issues 
captured by Wüsthagen et al (2007) as dimensions of ‘social acceptability’. 
Infrastructure planning and consenting, by dint of their potential openness to 
heterogeneous and competing interests (concerned publics, impacted environments) is 
a key sphere in which contextual embeddedness has to be negotiated.  
These perspectives provide valuable angles on the potential effects of sub-national 
government on energy transition pathways. Greater contextual attunement has long 
been held as a virtue of more localised action. Indeed, the positive normative claims 
that are widely made for local action on sustainability, that it facilities better links with 
actors, and leads to policies better adapted to local conditions, have also been made in 
arguments for political devolution and have relevance to energy issues. Sub-national 
governments may indeed facilitate innovative technological or social practices that are 
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responsive to local contexts and constituencies, but they may work to facilitate the 
reproduction of socio-technical regimes as much as radical alternatives. This leads to 
more fundamental, critical points about scale, re-scaling and sustainability transitions -  
that an uncritical emphasis on technological innovation risks ignoring the social and 
political qualities of the sustainable energy pathways that may be emerging at sub-
national levels (Lawhon and Murphy 2011; Hodson and Marvin 2013). After all, 
renewable energy technologies – whether they be novel or not - can be deployed in 
ways that challenge prevailing social and economic arrangements, or which serve to 
reproduce dominant socio-technical regimes. 
From this discussion one can see how government at any level may pursue a diversity of 
actions and agendas in shaping energy pathways. How then might agency and the links 
to outcomes be conceptualised?  
 
2.2 Actors and networks 
There is an overlapping consensus that to understand sustainability transitions it is 
important to understand networks of actors – their composition, configuration (sectoral 
and spatial) and strategies (e.g. Dawley et al 2015; Kern et al 2014). In many cases, 
researchers are less specific on how precisely networks of actors should be analysed, 
and with what causal theories in mind. The requirement for a clear theoretical 
framework increases where comparative research is to be conducted, to understand 
how particular actor arrangements in particular territories influence transition dynamics 
and outcomes. Moreover, any such framework should look beyond those sets of actors 
working to ‘create’ new artefacts or pathways (Lawhon and Murphy 2011), and be 
sensitive to the likelihood that the governance of energy is the subject of struggle, 
entailing competing conceptions of sustainability and alternative pathways. Relations 
between actors may be conflictual as well as consensual (Szarka 2007; Geels et al 2016), 
and how conflicts are managed may have a significant bearing upon outcomes. 
The theoretical framework adopted here is ‘policy networks analysis’, representing the 
constellations of regime actors that encourage or resist energy transition at any 
particular scale. In the Marsh-Rhodes formulation (Marsh and Rhodes 1992), policy 
networks analysis identifies ‘policy communities’ where a relatively small, restricted 
number of key actors share core policy goals in a particular policy field, enjoying stable 
relationships based on high levels of interdependence, which encourages policy stability 
and continuity. This situation is contrasted with fields shaped by ‘issues networks’, 
where a larger, more fluid set of actors, of limited interdependence, are concerned with 
an issue but contestation of core goals remains more omnipresent. Influence on policy is 
more dispersed and policy turbulence can be a result. Using this framework, one might 
expect the significance of actor network coherence to vary whether one is concerned 
with the opening up of pathway choices or with implementation. On the latter, 
renewable energy expansion is likely to be most effective where a coherent policy 
community sustains consistent support over time, to underpin what are often large and 
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long-term investments, and to struggle where such conditions do not exist (see for 
example Lauber 2012).  
If policy network analysis offers potential, it too needs interpretation in a manner 
sensitive to the spatial constitution of agency and governance. As Haughton et al (2010) 
suggest, shifting the scale of government structures can affect the constellation of 
actors that participate in policy and the policies that emerge. However, a focus on 
internal network configurations between actors within a territory risks neglecting the 
ways in which agency is jointly produced by the interactions of actors centred upon a 
particular arena with others beyond their territorial space (Carter and Smith 2009). 
Transition researchers have followed economic geographers in advocating the adoption 
of strategic-relational perspectives on regional space (Raven et al 2012; Murphy 2015). 
Such perspectives can alert us to the ways in which some institutions – notably those of 
the state, but also perhaps major businesses – can greatly affect the operation of those 
trying to construct effective policy communities at a local or regional scale (MacLeod 
and Goodwin 1999), which in turn can influence the objectives, instruments, rules, 
practices and outcomes of energy transitions (Kuzemko et al 2016). 
Political scientists have developed concepts that help to link actor configurations with 
the evolving, constructed nature of governance territoriality. One might expect to see 
devolved governments forming the focus of ‘territorial policy communities’ (Bomberg 
1994), characterised by a relatively small number of actors, with close, informal 
linkages, working in an integrated fashion across different policy instruments. Arguably 
one should be interested in the extent to which policy communities become 
progressively territorialised; in some instances becoming more embedded over time in 
the space of sub-national government (Carter and Smith 2009), yet also perhaps, in 
particular sectors, exhibiting dependence on national state actions to achieve particular 
goals within their territory (Dawley et al 2015). Viewed in this way, understanding the 
power of sub-national governments to act is not merely a matter of reading the formal 
powers at their disposal and how they deploy them, but also of tracing whether other 
actors become aligned around them, or choose to prioritise sub-national policy arenas 
for achieving their objectives. 
If policy network analysis provides a simple, formal structure for comparative causal 
analysis, there are also some deficiencies that ought to be recognised. The category of 
‘interdependencies’ that shape network form is often characterised in terms of 
resources that can be pooled and exchanged. Such resources, suggests Rhodes (1999, as 
discussed in Toke 2010) are constitutional-legal, hierarchical (concerned with control), 
financial, political (e.g. legitimacy) and informational. The breadth of this category is 
both a weakness and a strength, on the one hand placing pressure on analysts’ 
judgement about the relative ‘size’ of particular interdependencies constituted by 
disimilar resource elements, yet on the other offering heuristic value (Toke 2010) and 
giving the framework the flexibility to embrace a diverse set of factors. Recognition also 
needs to be given to how non-human elements can exert agency in shaping change. 
Thus for example, the availability of indigenous energy sources, or ‘materially obdurate 
infrastructures’ like grid systems (Hodson and Marvin 2013) can help reproduce the 
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dominance and spatial reach of major incumbent actors (e.g. grid operators, market 
regulators). Potential development sites are also an important dimension of systems of 
energy provision, with material as well as affective and institutional dimensions.  
The analysis proceeds by charting how the devolved governments in the UK have sought 
to affect renewable energy development, utilising and testing the explanatory power of 
policy networks analysis. It begins by considering how devolution created new actors 
and re-distributed formal powers within the energy sphere. 
 
3 UK devolution and the governance of the electricity sector 
3.1 New actors, legacies and distributions of power 
The prime effect of devolution in the UK from 1998 has been to create a set of new 
political and government actors for the territories of Northern Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales. In each of the territories new assemblies and executives have been given the 
powers formerly exercised directly by central government ministers. In terms of policy 
network analysis, devolution brings with it a reallocation of resources between 
Westminster and the devolved governments - constitutional-legal, hierarchical, financial 
and political legitimacy – but the reallocation is assymetric and complex. Scotland 
received a Parliament with primary legislative and tax-varying powers, Northern Ireland 
received primary legislative responsibilities but no powers over tax while the Wales’ 
Assembly initially received only secondary legislative powers. Complexity also arises 
from the fact that the creation of new, sub-national government actors did not bring 
with it a neat and clear division of powers and responsibilities, with energy and 
electricity being a particularly grey ‘grey area’ (Keating 2005), as Table 1 summarises. 
[Insert Table 1 near here] 
Central government in Westminster remains a pivotal actor, retaining control of key 
energy-related powers and financial resources. The main centres of governing capability 
are still located in UK government departments - the Department of Energy and Climate 
Change (DECC) - with financial support for renewable energy subject to the budgetary 
control of the Treasury (Toke 2010). Arms-length regulators also play key roles in 
managing Great Britain-wide energy markets, as does the company National Grid in its 
role as operator of the grid network across England, Scotland and Wales. Security of 
supply, markets and competitiveness thus remain central government concerns. 
Of the devolved governments, Northern Ireland possesses the widest suite of formal 
energy-related powers3, including powers to design and operate systems of market 
support. This notionally significant autonomy reflects the fact that electricity networks 
in Northern Ireland have historically been functionally detached from the rest of the UK, 
exhibiting greater cross-border integration with the Republic of Ireland. In Scotland, key 
aspects of energy policy are ‘executively devolved’, including control over major energy 
consents and planning, and operational control over aspects of market support. The 
Welsh Government has the fewest energy-related powers, of which the most pertinent 
 10 
 
are in planning policy. All of the devolved governments received responsibility for 
discretionary economic development funding which can be spent, inter alia, on energy-
related projects. 
So, devolution has to some degree dispersed formal capacities to steer the socio-
technical regime for electricity within the UK nation state beyond Westminster, but 
‘formal competencies are only an indicator of the potential power of an organization’ 
(Coulson and Ferrario 2007, p.607). Policy network analysis alerts us to how far the 
politicians and officers of devolved governments interact with other actors, the kind of 
networks formed, and the implications for policy – issues we return to below. Before 
this, however, it is necessary to assess how the devolved governments have utilised the 
powers available to them to affect renewable energy development and the outcomes. 
The account focuses on market support for renewable energy and land use planning, 
both instruments being critical in shaping renewable energy deployment (Szarka 2007). 
 
3.2 Market support 
In most countries, renewable energy technologies receive some form of financial 
support to enable them to compete with conventional power generation. In the UK, 
central government actors – DECC and the Treasury – have the prime role in designing 
market support systems, which operate broadly consistently across the nation. Thus, the 
switch from financial support issued through the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation, which was 
rather unsuccessful (Mitchell 1996), to the Renewables Obligation (RO) in 2002 (2005 in 
Northern Ireland) stimulated an upturn in renewable energy investment observable in 
all parts of the UK (see Figure 1).4 A key question then, is whether the powers available 
to the devolved governments to influence market support have affected the delivery of 
renewable energy in their territories. 
The RO is essentially a quota/tradable certificate system of support which sets electricity 
suppliers an obligation to achieve increasing targets of renewable energy. ‘Renewables 
Obligation Certificates’ (ROCs) are issued to renewable generators in respect of the units 
of electricity they produce, which suppliers must then purchase or suffer financial 
penalties for every unit of energy they fail to supply towards their target. The RO was 
formally broken up into three separate mechanisms for England and Wales (Wales 
having no autonomy here), Scotland and Northern Ireland (see Table 1). However, the 
ROCs can be transferred between operators and thus the different territories, the logic 
being that the RO should operate as a single UK market. The costs of complying with the 
RO are paid ultimately by all UK citizens through their electricity bills. 
The devolved governments have used their powers to emphasise different technologies. 
In Northern Ireland the NIRO has a special banding for small-scale renewables 
(<500kW), including farm-scale anaerobic digestion. The Scottish Government led the 
UK in using its operational powers to set higher ROC levels for particular technologies, 
notably newer, emerging wave and tidal stream power, allocating them 5 and 3 
ROCs/megawatthour (MWh) respectively (Winskel 2007). This differential support only 
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operated from 2008 until 2011, until the UK government extended the higher bandings 
to England and Wales, but interviewees in Wales and Northern Ireland suggest that this 
‘first mover’ action contributed to the greater growth of commercialisation and testing 
facilities for these technologies in Scotland, whereas in the rest of the UK local 
companies were left ‘feeding off the breadcrumbs’ (NIAca1). 
However, although Scotland and Northern Ireland have altered the RO for emergent 
technologies, this power has been less important in shaping the overall volumes of 
renewable energy installed in these territories to date than the fact that both benefit 
from being part of an integrated, UK-wide pool of market support. The RO has 
channelled funding from all UK electricity consumers to support the rapid growth, 
mainly, of on-shore wind – the most readily available renewable energy technology. 
Northern Ireland has elected to be part of the UK-wide system for these reasons, too: if 
it operated its own financial support scheme in isolation, or in collaboration with the 
Republic of Ireland, its smaller pool of electricity consumers would mean less money 
available. 
The fact that the Scottish Government has been seen as delivering a rapid expansion of 
renewable energy has given it important hierarchical and political resources for 
negotiation in UK-centred networks with Westminster, especially given 
interdependencies created by the UK’s requirement to deliver on EU renewable energy 
targets. We discuss this further below. However, this has not led to the devolved 
governments being able to influence the development of market support in any 
fundamental way. So, from 2010 deepening UK government concerns about the cost-
effectiveness of the RO led to its replacement by a new system of support - Contracts 
for Difference (CfD) (DECC, 2011). The Scottish Government had good reason to object: 
CfD was designed, in part, to support new nuclear capacity to which the Scottish 
Government was opposed, and was also to be more firmly centralised in its operation, 
thus extinguishing the executive powers that Scotland enjoyed under the RO.  Although 
the Scottish Government did raise objections5 they were not sustained, reflecting in part 
economic beliefs that, as in Northern Ireland, achieving major renewable energy 
expansion within their territory meant being able to tap into a UK-wide pool of 
resources. Resource dependencies underpin interdependence around renewable energy 
expansion. 
 
3.3 Planning and consents onshore 
Renewable energy developers often decry planning as a key ‘barrier’ to deployment but, 
whatever the veracity of this claim (Cowell 2007), there is no doubt that planning 
processes shape the engagement of different actors, mediate the contextual factors 
admissible in making decisions, and thereby affect the availability of development sites. 
Moreover, land use planning and energy consenting are almost entirely devolved (see 
Table 1), giving much scope for autonomous policy development. Table 2 captures how 
planning arrangements for renewable energy have been adjusted since devolution, 
showing that a key axis of variation is the extent to devolved governments have sought 
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to determine consents centrally, themselves, and steer local government decision-
making. 
 [Insert Tables 2 and Table 3 near here] 
The planning system for renewable energy in Northern Ireland has distinctive qualities, 
arising from the fact that local authorities have not had major planning powers. Until 
April 2015, all planning applications for renewable energy in Northern Ireland were 
determined centrally by the Department of the Environment.  Decisions were 
underpinned by policy guidance for renewable energy, but this has tended to adopt 
more flexible, criteria-based approaches to siting issues than seen elsewhere in the UK. 
Centralised consenting and flexible guidance help explain why Northern Ireland has 
consistently exhibited the highest consent rate for renewable energy applications of any 
part of the UK (see Table 3), but one also needs to consider the limited significance of 
potentially disruptive actors, as discussed below. 
In England and Wales, an enduring facet of the planning system is that onshore energy 
projects over 50MW are determined by Westminster while those below are determined 
by local government. In both territories, however, planning arrangements have altered 
significantly since 1998 as governments have sought to respond to growing public 
opposition to onshore wind in particular.  In order to underpin the delivery of renewable 
energy and navigate environmental concerns, the Welsh Government used its policy-
making powers to introduce a national zoning framework to give a supportive policy 
context for large-scale on-shore wind energy development in seven demarcated areas of 
upland Wales (WAG 2005; Cowell 2007). This guidance was interpreted by the wind 
energy sector as stabilising the conditions for investment, with the zones attracting 
applications totalling over 2000MW in capacity – twice initial expectations. This level of 
interest exceeds anything achieved onshore in comparable regions of England (DECC 
2013). However, the resulting spatial concentration of large-scale windfarm applications 
and attendant requirement for major new grid connections fomented vociferous public 
protest. Protests groups prompted some local councils to lodge objections to wind farm 
applications within the seven zones despite the notionally supportive policy, forcing 
public inquiries. As a result the installation of new wind capacity has been slower and 
patchier than anticipated. 
Westminster planning policy for renewable energy in England can be characterised into 
two phases. From 1998 until 2010, successive Labour Governments sought to create a 
more supportive policy framework, with pro-development planning guidance issued to 
local planning authorities. Beyond a tepid interest in regional spatial zoning and sub-
national targets, these governments largely ignored NGO pressure for more strategic 
spatial guidance. However, as part of wider moves to streamline and accelerate major 
infrastructure consenting, energy projects over 50MW (including renewables) were 
subjected to new ‘fast track’ procedures. The 2010 election saw the creation of a 
coalition government, with a dominant Conservative Party contingent seeking to act on 
public disquiet about wind energy in particular, leading to successive steps to give local 
planning authorities more control over renewable energy applications (see Table 2). 
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These steps made local configurations of actors more important in decision-making 
(DCLG 2012; Harvey and Walker 2013), which has been perceived by the industry as 
adversely affecting consent rates (indeed, see Table 3). 
The planning regime in Scotland is viewed more positively by renewable energy 
interests than those in England and Wales, even though devolution triggered relatively 
incremental changes. The Scottish Government has continued to determine ‘major’ 
energy projects centrally but without the major streamlining reforms undertaken by 
Westminster. The significance of these arrangements is magnified by the fact that 
Scotland has more large sites for wind farms, thus many more projects weigh in over 
50MW and are determined centrally. Of the 27 consented wind farms over 50MW in the 
UK in operation by the start of 2016, 20 are in Scotland.6 With renewable energy 
proposals below 50MW, the Scottish Government has worked actively with local 
planning authorities (LPAs) to help them take a facilitative approach to development. 
Although successive policy guidance has encouraged LPAs to identify preferred areas for 
wind energy and areas where it would be less acceptable, the Scottish Government has 
intervened to challenge authorities that pursue policies it regards as too spatially 
restrictive7. 
No government – national/UK or devolved - has found an effective way to expedite new 
high voltage grid capacity. Such schemes are usually conflictual and slow to come to 
fruition, a reflection of disruptive landscape and environmental effects of threading 
highly visible infrastructure through rural environments and the resulting opposition. 
The 220km Beauly-Denny line, designed to enhance the grid’s capacity to export 
renewable energy from the Scottish Highlands, took nine years from application to the 
issuing of consent. However, if the devolved governments have not been able to 
manage or reduce public opposition to such schemes, the Scottish Government did at 
least convey security of outcome. Grid enhancement schemes were identified in its 
National Planning Frameworks as of ‘national interest’, to which Governmental support 
was attached, thus underpinning business confidence. 
 
3.4 The view offshore 
For the period up to 2009 the development of new renewable energy capacity in the UK 
was largely a story of the uneven development of on-shore wind. However, since then, 
offshore wind has become a bigger fraction of overall UK renewable energy capacity, 
reaching 3600MW by January 2013 (and 4500MW by 20148). Moreover, examining the 
offshore realm casts a different light on the effects of devolved government. 
Given that the devolved governments have all expressed strong interest in expanding 
marine renewables, it is noteworthy that Kern et al’s explanation (2014) of the rise of 
offshore wind in the UK does not identify them as significant actors. Our research 
concurs that a pivotal role is occupied by the UK Government, which was central in 
increasing market support for offshore wind (to 2 ROCs/MWh), and the Crown Estate, a 
UK-wide public agency that has acted ‘entrepreneurially’ (Kern et al 2014, 640) in 
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organising the licensing of areas of sea to prospective energy developers. The emphasis 
on large-scale investments has also reinforced the role of major construction and energy 
companies, most of them multi-national. English regional development agencies are also 
seen as important (Dawley et al 2015). Does this mean that devolved governments have 
had little effect on outcomes in this sector? 
Devolved governments have been active in spheres where they have relevant powers, 
such as planning and consenting (see Table 3). The Scottish Government created a 
dedicated in-house agency, Marine Scotland, to provide a ‘one stop shop’ 
consenting/licensing agency for marine projects – exploiting its greater scope to pull 
together a more integrated set of arrangements than can readily be achieved for 
England or Wales. However, while some offshore wind farms have attracted opposition 
(Ellis et al 2007; BBC News 2014), only more rarely has public, NGO and local 
government opposition actually thwarted projects compared to onshore wind, with 
planning issues offshore being more concerned with mediating the interests of 
organisational actors in fishing, navigation and conservation (Kidd et al 2012). In all parts 
of the UK consenting is centralised i.e. the role of local government is limited. These 
factors make differences in planning procedures between devolved governments less 
relevant to development outcomes. 
The promotion of emergent wave and tidal stream technologies has been given great 
attention by the devolved governments. We noted above how Scotland had varied RO 
support to attain a competitive advantage for R & D development, but the devolved 
governments have also used their discretionary economic development spending.  
Scotland successfully pulled in UK-government funded development facilities like the 
Catapult centre for Offshore Renewable Energy, showing its status within cross-UK 
strategies for industrial development. It has also provided the biggest share of funding 
for the European Marine Energy Centre, based in Orkney, and issued leases for several 
commercial sized schemes in its Pentland Firth marine renewable development zone 
(see also Dawley et al 2015). The devolved governments of Northern Ireland and Wales 
have also supported demonstration and utility-scale facilities around their coasts (e.g 
the SeaGen project in Northern Ireland and DeltaStream in Wales). In addition, the 
Scottish and Northern Ireland governments have projected themselves as leading 
advocates for marine renewables, and been active in raising the profile of marine 
renewables within the European Union.  They have been leading partners in EU-funded 
projects to promote marine energy grids that would better capture potential energy 
development (Scottish Government et al 2012). 
What is questionable is whether actions by the devolved governments have markedly 
affected deployment to date. Patterns of offshore wind development reflect mainly the 
intersection of economics, shaped by national-level policy networks around market 
support centred on Westminster, and physical geography. Most turbines have been 
installed in the English North Sea and Liverpool Bay (bridging England and Wales), where 
the shallow seas allow lower development costs, and criticism from publics and 
landscape groups has been limited in its effect (Cowell et al 2012). Scottish and 
Northern Irish licensed areas tend to be in deeper water, which raises costs; a critical 
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factor shaping project realisation as national policy agendas came increasingly to 
emphasise cost reduction. Consequently, offshore wind energy development has 
reduced, and remains concentrated in the English North Sea. Wave and tidal energy 
technologies remain at early stages of commercialisation, with progress highly 
vulnerable to turbulence in funding (ENDS 2015a). 
 
4 Discussion – explaining policy choices and outcomes 
The analysis above assesses how regime factors, such as policy choices by the devolved 
governments have affected renewable energy outcomes. Turning to candidate 
explanations for these development patterns, a number of lines of inquiry appear 
relevant but might be set aside. Path dependencies in terms of pre-devolution 
endowments of renewably generated electricity offer insufficient explanation: Scotland 
already had significant hydro capacity by 1998 but this has not been the basis of 
expansion since devolution; Wales had 150MW of on-shore wind installed by 1998 but 
saw slow rates of growth thereafter. Proximity between key actors is widely seen as 
helping to facilitate network formation (Hansen and Coenen 2015), such that one would 
expect the smaller size of sub-national governments to facilitate solidaristic, territorial 
policy communities (Bomberg 1994). Our interviewees attested to the small size and 
much greater accessibility of policy-relevant actors in all three devolved governments 
(describing them as ‘a bit of a village’ [ScotNGO1]) but the difference in outcomes 
between them indicates that proximity should not be viewed in simplistic, spatial terms. 
How then might analysis of policy networks enhance our explanations of the 
continuities and changes in policy across the UK? 
 
4.1 Policy networks and Scottish ‘success’? 
In a number of respects, it is in Scotland that policy networks have been most conducive 
to the large-scale delivery of renewable energy. As our interviewees remark, ‘It’s no 
secret that everybody looks towards Scotland as being the leader’ (NITRA1). This is 
attributed partly to the Scottish National Party and its political leadership, which has 
long regarded energy development as central to the economic future of an independent 
Scotland (Hamilton 2002), and is seen as having ‘gone gung-ho for renewables’ since 
forming their first government in 2007 (ScotGov4). Importantly, however, the expansion 
of renewable energy has attracted support in Scotland across the main three political 
parties - SNP, Labour and the Liberal Democrats - from the first days of devolved 
government (SNP 1999; Scottish Government 2001). This temporal continuity created 
the time for governing capacity to be developed, agendas to be refined and linkages 
between actors to emerge. 
Integral to these arrangements is the existence within Scotland of a series of actors that 
could then be pulled into close alignment. This includes major energy businesses such as 
ScottishPower9  and Scottish and Southern Energy, long-standing national and regional 
development agencies (Scottish Enterprise and Highlands and Islands Enterprise); as 
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well as a cross-technology trade association for renewable energy (Scottish 
Renewables), formed in 1996 and autonomous from trade associations elsewhere in the 
UK. These actors are all supportive of the Scottish Government’s expansionist 
aspirations for renewable energy. The territorial connections of these actors to Scotland 
are relatively strong, but they have also been cultivated actively by the Scottish 
Government, which brought them into the energy policy-making process, notably in the 
Energy Advisory Board (seen by some interviewees as a more important arena for 
discussion than the Scottish Parliament) and the Forum for Renewable Energy 
Development in Scotland. Underpinning this collaboration, ‘it’s about convergence of 
interest and capability and opportunity, to be frank’ (ScotAdv1); a recognition of the 
powerful interdependencies between renewable energy targets, the investment 
potential of business actors and the policy and political resources that the Scottish 
Government possessed. In turn, economic actors have certainly been keen to represent 
the benefits of renewable energy to Scottish publics, for example by promoting 
arrangements for providing community benefits from on-shore windfarms; as one Chief 
Executive said, ‘(t)he time has come where we want to do even more to ensure more 
specific benefits from our renewable energy programme are delivered to the people 
and economy of Scotland’10.  
Scottish Governments have thus been able to mobilise a strong and relatively 
territorialized policy community. The alignment of government and industry actors has 
been facilitated by the policy framing of renewable energy. Successive Scottish 
Governments have positioned renewable energy expansion as central to Scotland’s 
national economic and environmental future; with a sustained emphasis on green jobs, 
growth and international competitive advantage (see SNP 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011). The 
policy community surrounding energy development in Scotland in turn helps legitimise 
and rationalise the Scottish Government’s full and assertive use of the powers made 
available to it by the devolution settlement. As one former minister put it, ‘we took 
energy on and worked with that almost as if it was an unspoken claim of right’ 
(ScotGov4), while the industry feels that ‘civil servants are empowered to get on and 
address barriers’ (ScotCom2). This is very clear in the preparedness of Scottish 
Government officers and ministers to encourage local planning authorities to take a 
facilitative approach to projects. 
One can see how the interdependencies characteristic of policy communities (Marsh 
and Rhodes 1992) have built up. Integral to this temporal dynamic is that Scottish 
Governments have not just set successively higher domestic renewable energy targets 
but have met them; a ‘relational asset’ (Murphy 2015, 84) reinforcing Scottish 
Government credibility with the industry players. The Scottish Government’s reputation 
for helping deliver on UK-wide renewable energy targets has also secured it sympathetic 
relations within Westminster-based networks. Thus interviewees in England recall ‘I’ve 
heard DECC officials frequently say “we need the Scots” in order to deliver those 
targets’ (EngCom1). In terms of outcomes, the Scottish Government had long argued for 
reforms to transmission charges which would enable Scottish renewable generators to 
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pay lower rates for sending their power south to England. In 2012, OFGEM announced 
proposals which partly met their demands (Toke et al 2013). 
Analysts of sustainability transitions have been criticised for giving undue attention to 
elite alignment around technological change, neglecting how orchestrating cohesion can 
marginalise alternative voices (Lawhon and Murphy 2011; Späth and Rohracher 2012), 
yet marginalisation of critical voices may be central to explaining how certain 
development pathways persist and expand. Again, policy network analysis can be 
insightful. Scotland’s renewable energy expansion has certainly encountered conflicts, 
especially on-shore wind projects and major electricity grid reinforcements, with 
sections of the public and landscape NGOs among the major actors. However, such 
groups have found it harder to exercise influence in Scotland than in Wales or England, 
such that renewable expansion has scarcely been environmentally constrained. This is 
partly because larger swathes of Scotland’s prospective windfarm sites lie outside 
nationally protected landscapes or symbolically important ‘wild lands’, diminishing the 
policy resources of actors arguing for their protection. NGOs concerned with more 
‘domesticated’ rural landscapes are far smaller than their English equivalents (the 
Association for the Protection of Rural Scotland’s has only 600 members compared to 
tens of thousands for the Campaign for the Protection of Rural England). Such factors 
have made it difficult to challenge a sustained, national economic narrative around 
renewable energy expansion which enjoys consistent high-level support: 
‘there’s these phrases about world leadership in renewable technology and “the 
Saudi Arabia of renewable energy”, and so we keep hearing these phrases all the 
time and they have almost become unchallengeable’ (ScotNGO1). 
As cause and effect of this, party politicisation of renewable energy expansion has been 
negligible. 
 
4.2 Northern Ireland and Wales as counterfactual cases? 
The value of a policy networks analysis perspective is reinforced when we turn to 
explain why renewable energy development in the other devolved government 
territories has proven slower than in Scotland. In short, our research found less 
evidence of sustained, coherent policy communities forming around renewable energy 
expansion. 
In Northern Ireland, renewable energy displays qualities of an issues network (Marsh 
and Rhodes 1992), but limited cohesion within government is a more conspicuous 
element, reflecting the enduring sectarian nature of politics in this territory. As a result, 
the devolved Assembly only emerged fully from suspension in 2007. Moreover, the 
power-sharing arrangements that allocate ministerial postings to all the main parties 
leave responsibilities for renewable energy fragmented between a number of 
departments, characterised in their operation as ‘we get on with our business and you 
get on with yours’ (NIGOV2). This makes it hard to find clear champions to drive the 
agenda, or to forge policy communities around renewables expansion. Political 
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manifestos have tended to frame renewable energy in terms of helping helping farm 
diversification and the rural economy, reflecting the importance of agriculture sector 
actors in Northern Ireland politics, for which banding the NIRO to support anaerobic 
digestion is one policy outcome (see above).  All this helps to explain why renewable 
energy has been slower to take-off in Northern Ireland compared to Scotland, despite a 
wider set of formal powers. Offsetting the effects of these fragmentary policy networks, 
however, has been the configuration of actors around planning. Political involvement in 
renewable energy projects has been low in Northern Ireland, as have levels of local 
opposition (Barry and Doran, 2009), allowing development interests to maintain the 
case for a liberal planning policies that maximise siting flexibility. Despite its late starting 
position, on-shore wind in Northern Ireland has seen very rapid expansion of onshore 
wind compared to other parts of the UK.  
In Wales there has been more limited territorial congruity between government and 
business interests than in Scotland. Few major energy businesses have headquarters in 
Wales, and the staffing capacity of UK-wide renewable energy trade associations in 
Wales was minimal (consisting of one officer until 2012). At the same time, within the 
structure of the Welsh Government, energy had spent periods until 2011 closely tied to 
climate change policy, creating a ‘disconnection from the core economic development 
thinking’ (WalesNGO2). Elite consensus has also been more difficult to maintain. The 
National Assembly Sustainable Energy Group, which aimed at being cross-party, failed to 
attract consistent ministerial buy-in and folded in 2010. As noted above, initially the 
Welsh Government hoped to forge a stable, territorial policy community around wind 
energy expansion by engaging key actors from the industry, environment and local 
government sectors in a collaborative exercise to create new, spatial planning guidance 
(Stevenson 2009). Consensus did not materialise. Although industry actors came to back 
the strategy with investment, and it has been supported by major conservation NGOs, 
local community groups and landscape NGOs like the Campaign for the Protection of 
Rural Wales were never fully supportive and were able to politicise wind energy 
expansion, with pro-renewable energy politicians losing seats in local, general (UK) and 
Assembly elections to Conservative Party representatives with more oppositional 
stances. As a result, local planning authorities in mid-Wales have been difficult to bring 
into alignment with the Welsh Government policy. 
 
4.3 Fragmenting policy communities in England 
Although policy networks around renewable energy in Westminster were always more 
diffuse because of the bigger size of the UK government, since 2010 is has been possible 
to observe a significant fragmentation of renewable energy policy communities and 
their evolution into a more conflictual issues network.  Mounting local public opposition 
to on-shore wind (and field-scale solar), in parts of England attained greater national 
political salience with the election of the 2010 Coalition Government, more electorally 
sensitive to certain rural concerns and sceptical of key tenets of previous, Labour 
environmental agendas (ENDS 2011). One policy outcome, as discussed above, was the 
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legitimising of more restrictive local planning approaches to on-shore wind (see Table 
2), with actors that previously found it difficult to influence the pro-renewables regimes 
becoming more influential. As one countryside protection NGO officer said, ‘we got 
rather more policy change than we expected’.11 
 
However, whereas changes to planning apply only to England, pressure from 
Conservative Party MPs12 also informed government actions with a wider spatial reach, 
such as an accelerated programme of scaling back market support for on-shore wind. 
The Coalition government also pressed for the EU to adopt decarbonisation targets 
rather than national renewable energy targets post-2020. Both moves were designed 
inter alia to allow greater flexibility in energy pathway choice (ENDS 2015b), allowing 
nuclear power to play a major role. 
 
This recalibration of policy objectives and technology choices marginalised renewable 
energy actors within Westminster policy communities, as the resources they possessed 
– be they hierarchical, financial or political - were seen as less relevant to a government 
looking to other technological pathways. This included devolved governments like 
Scotland who, whatever close relations they may have developed with pro-renewable 
energy actors in DECC, are shown to be less influential in key Westminster policy 
networks shaping future UK energy development than the Treasury and ‘insider’ 
industrial and energy organisations pushing for energy market reform and nuclear 
expansion (Toke and Nielsen 2015).  As one Northern Ireland energy company put it 
“’Westminster doesn’t give a tootle about what happens in Belfast… they just ignore it 
as they have bigger fish to fry…” (NICom2). The spatial geometries of market support, 
controlled by the Treasury in the UK government, are a clear illustration of strategic-
relational perspectives on regional space (Raven et al 2012), insofar as they further 
highlight the fragile financial resources underpinning territorial policy communities. 
 
4.4 Sub-national government, scale and sustainability transitions 
 
Devolution in the UK and, with it, the reallocation of certain energy-related powers to 
the new sub-national governments has certainly impacted the evolution of renewable 
energy development, but the fact that the role of sub-national government has 
previously been rather under-recognised can be seen as reflective of wider blind spots 
in transition theorisation. While the devolved governments have all given support and 
‘protection’ to newer, innovative technologies, the main material effects of devolved 
government on renewable energy outcomes to date have been faster deployment of 
mature technologies, especially onshore wind. The ‘innovations’ – if this is the right 
word – that have made the difference to development outcomes are thus more in the 
fields of land use planning and consenting; measures that help to align investors with 
the availability of sites and manage the scope for dissenting voices in local government 
or civil society to delay or de-rail decisions. 
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A key illustration of this – as summarised in Table 2 - is the various ways that the 
devolved governments have exhibited greater centralisation of renewable energy 
project decision-making than in England/Westminster. Indeed, the contrasts have 
increased since 2015, with central government passing planning decisions for windfarms 
in England over 50MW to local planning authorities, while the Welsh Government has 
taken consenting powers away from the local level.  This was an outcome very much 
pushed for by the industry (Cowell 2016), and can be seen as a reflection of a more 
sustained lobbying presence in Wales since 2011. Far from sub-national government 
being automatically more open to local civil society actors, outcomes in the energy 
sector show a propensity of territorial policy communities to depoliticise policy arenas 
and marginalise disruptive views (Bomberg 1994). 
 
These findings show how the concept of a ‘protective space’ for development can be 
useful for understanding how the infrastructures of socio-technical regimes negotiate 
contextual conditions. As outlined above, maintaining the infrastructural and financial 
systems required to reproduce regimes is always potentially vulnerable to elements 
outside the system and requires a degree of protection such that stable conditions for 
operation and investment can be maintained. The Scottish Government has done a 
more effective job than in England or Wales of constructing arrangements for 
renewable energy expansion, aligning actors around them, and insulating expansion 
agendas from localised environmental challenges or politicisation that might bring these 
agendas into contingency, especially for on-shore wind. Many of the relevant actions 
have been in the sphere of planning, but one can also see the propensity of the Scottish 
Government to foster investment stability with its more limited powers in respect of 
market support e.g. its executive powers over ‘grandfathering’ (the guaranteeing of 
subsidies into the future for recipient projects) to maintain support for sub-5MW solar 
projects (ENDS 2015, 13-14) and the early announcement of ROC levels. By such means 
the Scottish Government has offered supportive ‘flanking conditions’ (Szarka 2007), in 
terms of how regulations and procedures governing the operation of a policy are 
organised and carried out; and it has done so at a time when Westminster was gaining a 
reputation in the renewable energy sector for policy disruption. 
 
Governments in England, Wales and Scotland have also sought to act on potential host 
communities for renewable energy infrastructure,  by promoting greater levels of 
community benefit payments from renewable energy projects to local communities and 
encouraging community-owned energy schemes. The Scottish Government is the most 
advanced in this agenda (Strachan et al 2015), and has linked financial support to a 
specific target of obtaining 500MW of community- and locally-owned renewables by 
2020. However, despite rhetoric of ‘a community energy revolution’ (Davey 2013), 
nowhere in the UK by 2013 had community renewables become more than a 
supplemental strategy to dominant, large-scale commercial forms of provision, offering 
little in terms of disruption to the centralised and market-led electricity system. 
Communitarian alternatives have not dislodged the dominant framing of renewable 
energy in the devolved governments, as a sector to be expanded at industrial scale, 
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supplying energy above ‘domestic’ demand, as the basis of export-related economic 
development. Policy networks analysis helps to explain this situation. Only to a minor 
extent has devolution created spaces in government for more, new voices pressing for a 
greater local control over (renewable) energy provision (Strachan et al 2015). Although 
community renewables actors evidently have links to devolved and UK governments, 
they tend not to populate the most significant policy networks (Bomberg and McEwen 
2012). 
 
 
5.0 Conclusions 
Our analysis has shown how the actions of sub-national government can shape wider 
dynamics of energy transition. Within the UK, the devolved governments have not been 
passive recipients of renewable energy investment in their territories, but have sought 
to encourage its development, using the powers available to them. This is clearest in 
Scotland, but both the Northern Ireland Executive and Welsh Government have also 
sought to steer development, adopting policy approaches that depart from Westminster 
norms. The analysis also offers useful wider insights into the spatial constitution of 
transitions towards more sustainable forms of energy. It shows how ‘national’ 
transitions are constituted by actions at other governmental levels. More 
fundamentally, while existing energy transitions literatures tend to focus on factors 
encouraging technological innovation, our research shows that in the devolved 
territories of the UK, in the sphere of electricity generation, it has been the regulation 
and steering of deployment of existing technologies (notably on-shore wind) in which 
sub-national government has had greatest effect on renewable energy development to 
date, notably in the way that planning processes have been used to orchestrate the 
delivery of new generation facilities.  
Policy network analysis has aided explanation. The extent to which sub-national 
governments are able to promote renewable energy is not straightforwardly reducible 
to the powers formally allocated to them; Scottish Governments have achieved a more 
impressive level of development than Northern Ireland (or England in some respects) 
with fewer formal powers at their disposal.  This power in actu can be attributed to the 
ability of successive Scottish Governments to forge coherent policy communities around 
renewable energy expansion, which are relatively strongly territorialised, that galvanise 
and are galvanised by the use of the available governance powers in an assertive 
manner. That devolved governments remain dependent on how the UK government 
organises market support is also readily apparent, such that Scotland’s wind energy 
expansion ‘may have been facilitated by the [Scottish] planning system but it’s really 
been driven by the subsidy’ (ScotNGO1). Yet national state policy developments are also 
amenable to explanation through policy networks, notably the minimal influence of 
devolved governments on debates about market support and the fragmentation of 
policy communities around renewable energy expansion in Westminster into a more 
volatile issues network. 
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However, conducting comparative analysis has revealed other combinations of causal 
effects that suggest other lines of theorisation. Although absolute levels of development 
are lower (perhaps because it is the smallest territory), Northern Ireland has still 
achieved rapid renewable energy expansion, especially of on-shore wind, and without 
such an obviously coherent policy community or visible political ambition. Relative 
absence of effective opposition, compared to other parts of the UK, has relevance here. 
Forging coherent networks around energy development may matter more where there 
are potentially effective opposing actors (see also Cheon and Urpelainen 2013), and this 
in turn, may be particularly relevant to certain combinations of technological pathways 
and contexts. Seen in this light, Scotland has best displayed the kind of actor networks 
conducive to facilitating renewable energy expansion based on the bulk provision of 
controversial technologies like on-shore wind, where sustained elite cohesion around 
the conjunction of financial support and stable planning conditions are particularly 
important for investment. The rolling out of decentralised electricity systems based on 
micro-renewables, in which the navigation of land use planning constraints is less critical 
than the kntting together of highly localised actors, may entail very different policy 
networks and a different position for sub-national governments.  
This leads to wider questions about the spatial constitution and embeddedness of socio-
technical regimes. Our results suggest that devolution in the UK, although it has 
fostered the expansion of certain renewable energy technologies, has largely served to 
maintain dominant systems of energy provision based on large facilities supplying 
electricity into an organisationally unchanged grid. Rather than providing ‘protective 
spaces’ for system-changing innovations, the UK case shows how sub-national action 
can facilitate the spatial adaptability and temporal persistence of dominant socio-
technical regimes. In planning and consenting, the three devolved governments pursued 
arrangements that created more facilitative ‘protected spaces’ for infrastructure 
expansion than was observable in England. One could conclude that devolution in the 
UK is an illustration of ‘stabilizing landscape trends’ (Geels 2011, 36) - i.e. a set of wider 
processes that exerts a stabilizing effect on existing regimes, but does so by facilitating 
contextual adaptation. Arguably one ought not be surprised at this, given that 
devolution in the UK is itself part of ongoing statecraft designed very largely to manage 
tensions within this union state. It shows why analysts of energy transitions ought to 
give greater attention to the politics of state re-scaling (Hodson and Marvin 2013), and 
recognise how this may serve ‘conservative’ agendas, that maintain key elements of the 
status quo as well as offer opportunities for radical change. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: Installed renewable energy capacity in the UK, 2003-2014 
 
Sources:  RESTATS historic regions data, UK Government regional energy statistics, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/regional-renewable-statistics accessed 
27th May 2016 
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Table 1: Devolution, government actors and energy-related powers (until 2015) 
 
Country UK and England Northern 
Ireland 
Scotland Wales 
Devolved 
institutions 
Limited 
decentralisation of 
roles to regional 
bodies, until 2011 
Assembly and 
Executive; 
primary 
legislative 
powers; no 
powers over 
tax 
Parliament and 
Government; 
primary 
legislative 
powers; tax-
varying powers 
National Assembly 
and Government; 
secondary legislative 
powers; spending 
only responsibilities 
[1]  
Energy policy Full competence Fully devolved Executively 
devolved 
Not formally 
devolved 
Market support 
for renewable 
energy 
Full competence Fully devolved Executive 
devolution of 
some support 
schemes 
No powers 
Planning and 
consents 
(onshore) 
Full policy 
competence for 
England, partial for 
Wales; full 
competence over 
major projects 
(50MW plus) 
Fully devolved Fully devolved Partial powers over 
planning policy and 
consent for smaller 
schemes (below 
50MW) 
Planning and 
consents 
(offshore) [2] 
Full competence for 
English and Welsh 
Waters (subject to 
Welsh exceptions) 
Fully devolved Fully devolved Power to determine 
applications up to 
1MW (exception 
under Transport and 
Works Act 1992) 
Economic 
development 
spending 
Full competence; 
decentralised 
delivery by English 
regional bodies until 
2011; some 
programmes are UK 
wide. 
Fully devolved; 
can receive 
UK-wide 
programme 
funding 
Fully devolved; 
can receive UK-
wide 
programme 
funding 
Fully devolved; can 
receive UK-wide 
programme funding 
 
[1] Noting that the Government of Wales Act 2006 gave the National Assembly the power to initiate 
primary legislation, and the 2011 referendum enabled the Assembly to pass primary legislation in those 
areas devolved to it without the consent of Westminster. 
 
[2] We do not include marine licensing powers and consenting for onshore connections for simplicity. The 
offshore regime applies mainly to applications in UK territorial waters (i.e. up to 12 nautical miles and 
designated Renewable Energy Zones).
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Table 2: Planning policy and renewable energy in the UK, post-devolution 
Territory Position at 1998 Significant Changes, 1998 to 2013 Changes, 2013 onwards 
Northern 
Ireland 
All applications determined by central 
government (Department of the 
Environment). Above 10MW, consent also 
needed from Department of Enterprise, 
Trade and Investment. 
 
Planning policy guidance introduced (Planning Policy 
Statement 18 [DoENI 2009]), with criteria-based 
approach to decisions, and supplementary best practice 
guidelines 
From April 2015 most planning 
functions were transferred to local 
planning authorities, but central 
government (DoE) retains control over 
renewable energy consents. 
Scotland Applications of 50MWor over and major 
grid network proposals determined 
centrally, by UK Government Ministers 
(Secretary of State for Scotland), managed 
by central Scottish consents unit, under 
Sections 36 and 37 of the Electricity Act 
1989. 
 
Applications below 50MW determined by 
local planning authorities under town and 
country planning (Scotland) legislation. 
 
Planning policy guidance issued in 1994 
gave criteria-based advice, and advised 
local authorities to demarcate in their 
local plans areas that would be suitable 
and unsuitable for wind farms (Scottish 
Office 1994). 
 
Applications of 50MWor over and major grid network 
proposals determined by Scottish Ministers, managed 
by central Scottish consents unit (powers acquired 
under Scotland Act 1998 (Transfer of Functions to the 
Scottish Ministers etc) Order (SI1999/1750). Nine 
month time target for determining applications 
introduced, post-2007. 
 
Applications below 50MW determined by local planning 
authorities under town and country planning (Scotland) 
legislation. 
 
Planning policy guidance issued in 2006revised and 
updated guidance, continuing advising local authorities 
to demarcate in their local plans areas that would be 
suitable and unsuitable for wind farms. Planning Advice 
Note 45 issues good practice guidance. 
 
National Planning Frameworks identify particular 
infrastructural schemes as ‘national developments’ for 
which there is government support. 
No significant changes. 
Wales Applications of 50MW or over and major 
grid network proposals determined 
centrally, by UK Government Ministers, 
process managed by central government 
consents team, under Sections 36 and 37 
of the Electricity Act 1989. 
 
Applications below 50MW determined by 
local planning authorities under town and 
country planning legislation for England 
and Wales. 
Applications of 50MW or over and major grid network 
proposals determined centrally, by the Infrastructure 
Planning Commission (under Planning Act 2008), then 
transferred back to UK Government Ministers (Localism 
Act 2011), with consents issued under fast track 
procedures. Decisions guided by National Policy 
Statements. 
 
Applications below 50MW determined by local planning 
authorities under town and country planning legislation 
for England and Wales. 
Applications over 50 up to 350MW to 
be determined by Welsh Government 
under Wales Bill 2016; applications 
over 350MW still determined centrally 
by UK government ministers under 
Localism Act 2011. 
 
Applications from10-50MW to be 
determined by Welsh Government, 
under the Developments of National 
Significance (Wales) Regulations 2016. 
 2 
 
 
Planning policy guidance (PG22) provided 
criteria-based guidance (Department of 
Environment and Welsh Office1993) 
 
2005 planning guidance (Technical Advice Note 8) 
institutes spatial zoning for wind farms over 25MW, 
giving presumption in favour of development within 
seven ‘Strategic Search Areas’. 
 
Applications below 10MW determined 
by local planning authorities [under 
town and country planning legislation 
for England and Wales] and Planning 
[Wales] Act 2015. 
England Applications of 50MW or over and major 
grid network proposals determined 
centrally, by UK Government Ministers, 
process managed by central government 
consents team, under Sections 36 and 37 
of the Electricity Act 1989. 
 
Applications below 50MW determined by 
local planning authorities under town and 
country planning legislation for England 
and Wales. 
 
Planning policy guidance (PG22) provided 
criteria-based guidance (Department of 
Environment and Welsh Office1993) 
Applications of 50MW or over and major grid network 
proposals determined centrally, by the Infrastructure 
Planning Commission (under Planning Act 2008), then 
transferred back to UK Government Ministers (Localism 
Act 2011), with consents issued under fast track 
procedures. Decisions guided by National Policy 
Statements. 
 
Applications below 50MW determined by local planning 
authorities under town and country planning legislation 
for England and Wales. 
 
Planning policy promoted criteria-based guidance 
(PPS22, ODPM 2004) and regional-scale mapping and 
target-setting (Power and Cowell 2012). Superseded by 
National Planning Policy Framework (2012) which 
endorsed local planning authorities instituting preferred 
areas for wind energy development in their local plans. 
 
From 2015, on-shore wind over 50MW 
to be determined by local planning 
authorities (under the Onshore Wind 
Generating Stations (Exemption) 
(England and Wales) Order 2016 (11th 
March 2016) and Infrastructure 
Planning (Onshore Wind Generating 
Stations) Order 2016 
 
New guidance, June 2015, that local 
planning authorities should only grant 
permission for onshore wind farms 
where the site is in an area identified 
as suitable for wind energy 
development in a local or 
neighbourhood plan and, following 
consultation, it can be shown that 
impacts identified by local 
communities have been fully addressed 
and that the proposal has their backing 
(Ministerial Statement to LPAs, 2015). 
From 2016, applies to all windfarms, 
including those of 50MW and over. 
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Table 3   On-shore wind project consent rates, 2011-2014 
 
 England Northern 
Ireland 
Scotland Wales 
2011-
2012 
58% 88% 70% 50% 
2012-
2013 
59% 78% 76% 46% 
2013-
2014 
31% 89% 62% 52% 
 
Data taken from Wind Energy in the UK 2014, State of the Industry Report 2013, State of the Industry Report 2012, produced by Renewables 
UK. Data is for projects under 50MW. 
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1 DUKES 2015 Regional spreadsheet 2003-2014 installed capacity MW, September 2015, accessed 27th May 2016. 
2 To preserve interviewee anonymity, we use a code system to identify specific interviews. ‘Scot’ means interviewee was based 
in Scotland, ‘NI’, Northern Ireland, ‘Wales’, Wales and ‘Eng’ in England or UK level. ‘Gov’ indicates that the interviewee works 
for the government (officer or politicians), ‘Adv’ = advisor, ‘LPA’ = local planning authority; ‘NGO’ = non-governmental 
environmental group; ‘Com’ = company, ‘Tra’ = trade association; ‘Aca’ = Academic. The number at the end differentiates 
interviewees within the same category of respondent. 
3 Apart from nuclear energy, of which it has none. 
4Feed-in Tariffs (FIT) are operated in a consistent way across England, Scotland and Wales, in a process managed by Ofgem, 
but do not operate in Northern Ireland.  FITs only kicked in in 2010 and only fund projects up to 5MW installed capacity. For 
these reasons they have not received detailed consideration in this paper. 
5 Correspondence, Alex Salmond to Chris Huhne, 12th July 2011. 
6 REUK database, accessed 26th April 2016. 
7 See also letters from Derek Mackay, Minister for Local Government and Planning of the Scottish Government, to Moray 
Council and Fife Council, 6th August 2013. 
8 DUKES 2015 Chapter 6, accessed 26th April 2016. 
9 Sold to Iberdrola in 2006. 
10 Ian Marchant 30th November 2011 http://www.sse.com/PressReleases2011/OnshoreWindCommunityInvestmentPlan/, 
accessed 18.02.2014. 
11 Pers comm.. 30th January 2013. 
12 The call by 100 MPs for reduced financial support for on-shore wind was mostly Conservative Party members, but did include 
two Liberal Democrats which, perhaps unsurprisingly, represented constituencies in rural Wales facing large-scale wind farm 
development and grid reinforcement. 
 
 
